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ABSTRACT
Spain has had a serious structural unemployment problem for the last 20
years. This paper argues that the interaction of ¯ring costs and job-to-job
°ows added to changes in unemployment bene¯ts, could provide an explanation
for equilibrium unemployment increasing, since 1984. First, we construct a
new series of job-to-job °ows and show it is signi¯cantly trended upwards and
positively related to the stock of ¯xed term contracts. Second, we develop
a search theoretic model, with ¯ring permissions and on-the-job search, and
simulate it for Spain. We show that the model can provide an explanation for
the evolution of structural unemployment in Spain. Finally, we argue that
an increase in the level of equilibrium unemployment can occur at the same
time that the economy becomes less dynamically sclerotic. Though in the case
of Spain, since 1992, the equilibrium unemployment rate has probably fallen
whilst the economy has continued becoming less dynamically sclerotic.
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1 Introduction
Spain has been one of the best performing economies in Europe, over the last six
or seven years. It has had one of the highest growth rates and the unemployment
rate has fallen nearly 10%, from a high of 24.6% in the ¯rst quarter of 1994, to
less than 15% currently. For most countries, a 10% fall in the unemployment
rate would be cause for celebration, yet Spain still has the highest unemployment
rate in the EEC. This one fact highlights the severe structural unemployment
problem Spain has had since Franco's death, when the unemployment rate was
around 5%. In this paper we attempt to understand the unusual nature of the
Spanish Labour Market, using a search model as our theoretical underpinning.
We argue that changes in the labour market, to employment protection and
unemployment bene¯ts, though they may have increased the natural rate of
unemployment, have probably made the labour made less dynamically sclerotic.
In other words, they have facilitated more labour market state transitions. We
focus, in particular, on the change of regime brought about by the introduction
of ¯xed term contracts in 1984. We argue that they have led not just to lower
¯ring costs, but a higher level of on-the-job search, due to the fall in job tenure.
Much research has focussed on the fact that the introduction of ¯xed term
contracts may have only reduced ¯ring costs, and thus increased °exibility, at the
margin, without a®ecting the core of the permanent employees ( see for example
Bentolila and Dolado 1994). Few, though, have looked at the link between the
introduction of ¯xed term contracts and job-to-job °ows. Yet this could be
equally if not more important, in the case of Spain. As the ¯gure below shows,
temporary contracts, as a % of total contracts, have increased dramatically in
Spain, to above 30% of the total number of employment contracts.
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Figure 1: % of employment contracts in Spain which are ¯xed term. Source:
EPA.
In Section 3, we construct a new measure of job-to-job °ows and show how it
has increased in line with the increase in the prevalence of temporary contracts.
Job-to-job °ows can undoubtedly have a very important e®ect on labour market
dynamics. Mortensen (1994) showed they were necessary to make the positive
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correlation of unemployment in°ows and out°ows, consistent with the negative
correlation of job creation and job destruction, in the US. Burgess (1994) shows,
in a simple search model, that if the proportion of the employed engaging in
search is sensitive to the chance of receiving an o®er, then the e®ect of the cycle
on the unemployment out°ow rate is damped. This is due to the competition
for jobs that employed job searchers provide the unemployed. Further, he
shows that the e®ect of the cycle on the in°ow rate is increased. As Burgess
notes, the introduction of on the job search can lead to some very interesting
and complicated dynamics of unemployment. For the above reasons, we take
account of job-to-job °ows when we analyse the Spanish Labour Market.
One natural way to try and explain Spain's unemployment dynamics is to
simulate a model which allows for the changes in labour market institutions that
have marked recent Spanish economic history. This paper carries out such an
exercise. We calibrate a search theoretic model, allowing for a structural break
in 1984, when temporary contracts were introduced, and simulate it for Spain.
Section 2 details the recent changes in Spanish economic institutions. Basically,
the structural break allows for: ¯ring costs to fall; on-the-job search to increase
and unemployment bene¯ts to increase.
The novel feature of the model, is that it pulls together various innovations
to the basic Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search theoretic model. First,
we include on-the-job search as ¯rst introduced by Mortensen (1994). Sec-
ond, we include ¯ring permissions as introduced by Garibaldi (1998), as well
as lump sum ¯ring costs. Firing permissions allow for the uncertainty in the
¯ring procedure in a way that a lump sum cost cannot capture. Garibaldi ar-
gues persuasively that this is an important consideration when considering the
economies of Continental Europe. Spain, ranked by the OECD as having one of
the highest degrees of employment protection, de¯nitely falls into this category.
We di®er from Garibaldi in that we use a Nash bargaining framework to model
wage setting. He uses a simpler approach, namely that employers capture all the
rents associated with a job-worker match, by paying workers the common alter-
native value of their time. However, one of the main routes by which institutions
a®ect labour market dynamics are through wages. The kind of assumption used
by Garibaldi, and ¯rst introduced by Jovanovic (1979, 1984), does not allow
for these kind of e®ects. Given that this paper is attempting to document the
e®ect of institutions on the labour market performance of Spain, this would be
a serious omission. Thus, we revert to Nash bargaining solution, which, while
complicating the model, allows for a much richer set of potential interactions.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we brie°y summarise the recent
labour market reforms to the Spanish economy. Second, we overview some of
the main facets of the Spanish labour market. In this section, we also construct
a new measure of job-job °ows, based on the EPA gross °ow data, and show
that it has had an increasing trend since the introduction of temporary con-
tracts. Third, we formulate a search model, with on-the-job search and ¯ring
permissions. Fourth, we do some comparative statics analysis. In particular,
we focus on two elements: a change in the degree of on-the-job search; and a
change in the speed at which ¯ring permissions arrive. We do these experiments
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for a calibrated US economy, to allow an easier comparison with the prevailing
literature. We discuss the e®ects of these changes on the dynamic correlations
of the labour market. Fifth, we calibrate and simulate the model for Spain,
allowing for a structural break in 1984 - when temporary contracts were in-
troduced. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of how much the model can
explain of recent Spanish history and we draw out predictions of future labour
market performance.
2 A summary of the changing institutions in the
Spanish Labour Market
There have been many structural reforms to the Spanish Labour Market since
the death of Franco (see Bover et al (2000) for a comprehensive survey). We
discuss a few of the important ones here: to employment protection and unem-
ployment bene¯ts.
Firing costs have been, e®ectively, very high in Spain. The OECD has
consistently ranked Spain as having one of the highest degrees of employment
protection. There have been signi¯cant legislative attempts to try and change
this. At the end of 1984, ¯xed term contracts, with lower ¯ring costs than
permanent contracts, were introduced, for all activities, whether temporary or
not. Further legislation was introduced in June 1997. This extended the causes
that may give rise to an individual dismissal and created a new permanent
employment-promoting contract whose main feature was lower unfair-dismissal
costs, with respect to regular permanent contracts. Spanish unemployment
remained stubbornly high even after the introduction of temporary contracts.
As mentioned earlier, the unemployment rate reached an all time high of 24.6%
in 1994.
The level and changes of unemployment bene¯ts have also been substan-
tial in Spain. As noted by Bover et al (2000), from the mid 80s to early 90s,
the replacement rate was up to 80% for certain categories of the unemployed.
Coverage also reached around 70% in 1993. Changes in legislation occurred
in 1984 and 1989, to increase the generosity of bene¯ts and in 1992 to reduce
them. Unemployment bene¯ts are considered important in determining equilib-
rium unemployment (see for example the work of Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991, 1998)). Spain has unquestionably a generous bene¯ts system when com-
pared to international norms. But the changes are equally important as the
level in explaining Spain's recent history. Bene¯ts probably became more gen-
erous in the period after 1984, if you take all the changes of legislation and the
dynamics of the coverage documented above. This has probably been important
in explaining why unemployment continued to rise after 1984, when temporary
contracts were introduced, peaking in 1994.
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3 Overview of recent labour market dynamics
in Spain
In the last ten years, there has been a change in focus in the economic literature.
Labour market °ow data such as: job creation, job destruction and unemploy-
ment °ows are routinely discussed, as well as simple stock measures such as the
unemployment and vacancy rate. There are two reasons for this: the pioneering
work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992 and 1996) in developing measures
of job creation and job destruction, and the development of search theoretic
models (see Pissarides (1990) and Blanchard and Diamond (1990, 1992)) which
suggested that looking at °ow data is necessary for explaining certain labour
market phenomena. For example, the degree of job-to-job °ows is not some-
thing that can be discerned from the stock of employment. Also as shown by
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the movement of unemployment and vacan-
cies are not su±cient to identify whether a shock is reallocative or aggregate -
we need to look at job creation and job destruction.
In this section, we look at: job; employment and unemployment °ow data,
to get a more detailed picture of the Spanish Labour Market. Our main source
is the gross °ow transition data collated by EPA, but we also construct a new
measure of job-to-job °ows. All data are seasonally adjusted using the US
Census X-11 method and are elevated by the appropriate factors to make them
representative of the total population. We provide a more complete discussion
of the data de¯nitions and sources in the appendix.
Measuring job-to-job °ows is notoriously di±cult (see Blanchard and Dia-
mond (1990) for a detailed discussion of some of the measurement error issues).
In the US, a new question in the CPS, introduced in 1994, allows one to measure
the number of transitions from one job to another. Mainly due to formidable
problems of: spurious individual transitions and aggregating these individual
responses into a time consistent series, the BLS has refrained from using this
new question to form a new job-to-job °ow measure. Hoyt Bleakley, in some
unpublished work at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, has tried to collate
the individual transitions, and has come up with a job-to-job °ow of 2.5% of
the initial employment rate, for the period 1994:1 to 1996:12. This is much
higher than the upper bound estimated in Blanchard and Diamond (1990) of
1.6%, and is probably due to measurement error problems. The Blanchard and
Diamond estimates, imply that about 20% of the employment in°ow is due to
job-to-job °ows, for the period 1968-1986.
Antolin (1999) made an attempt to measure job-to-job °ows for Spain, using
the individual records from several EPAs. He estimated that job-to-job °ows
averaged slightly higher than 50% of total employment in°ows, for the period
1987-94, and were increasing over the period1.
In this paper, we take a slightly di®erent approach. We utilise two sources
of data: the gross °ow transitions collated by EPA, by matching individual
1The calculations were only possible for the second quarter of each year, due to more
detailed questions in the EPA, for the second quarter.
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records over time; and the EPA o±cial measure of employment less than three
months. Of course, the EPA gross °ows are also subject to measurement error
problems as well (see Artola and Bell (1999) for a more detailed discussion of
this). In particular, there are problems of sample attrition and misclassi¯cation
errors, which are discussed in more detail in the appendix. As Blanchard and
Portugal (2000) note, these problems, which will lead to spurious transitions,
are likely to be more serious with cumulated monthly transitions than with
quarterly transitions2. In this paper we use quarterly EPA data.
We measure job-to-job °ows, on a quarterly basis from 1988q4 to 1999q3, as
the following3:
jj = n3 ¡ un ¡ ian (1)
where jj represents job to job °ows, n3 employment less than 3 months, un
the unemployment to employment transition, and ian the inactivity to employ-
ment °ow. We are assuming here that n3 is a good proxy for the employment
in°ow per quarter. It is used in the same way that unemployment less than a
month is used as a proxy for the unemployment in°ow. It su®ers from the same
problem, in that people who make the transition to employment and then out
of employment, within the quarter, will not be captured. But as Boeri (1999)
notes, given that the gross °ow transitions do not capture exactly the same kind
of transitions, the e®ect should be balanced out.
The job to job series we estimate has a mean of around 42%, in terms of
the total employment in°ow. Referring to ¯gure 2, jj also shows an increasing
trend over time. Given that our sample is longer (up to 99q3) than Antolin's,
it suggests that our estimates are signi¯cantly less than Antolin's. This could
be because his estimates capture more spurious transitions.
2Still, Artola and Bell (1999) estimate that 12.5% of the Spanish unemployed were mis-
classi¯ed into a di®erent labour market state in the ¯rst quarter of 1994. They also argue
though, that the standard Abowd and Zellner (1985) measurment error correction is not very
e®ective for Spain. For this reason we continue to use the measured labour market °ows in
the following analysis.
3we start in 88q4 rather than 87q2 as there seems to be some problems with n3 variable
in 87q3 and 88q3. In particular, it seems too small as we get a negative measure of job-to-job
°ows. We are currently looking at ways to resolve this problem.
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Figure 2: the left hand scale refers to the % of temporary contracts and the
right hand scale, to the % of job-to-job °ows.
As Pissarides (1994) notes, one of the most robust facts about job-to-job
°ows is their pro-cyclicality. This is documented for the US by Blanchard and
Diamond (1990), the UK by Burgess (1994) and Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for
several other European countries. In Spain, we ¯nd the correlation between job-
to-job °ows normalised by total employment, jjn and net employment growth
changes (netg) to be 0.13, i.e. procyclical as expected. But, the increase in
temporary contracts has probably been the main driver of job-to-job °ows as
illustrated strikingly in Figure 2. There are intuitive reasons for this link. Pis-
sarides (1994) illustrates that in a search model, on-the-job search is much more
likely at short job tenures. The mechanism behind the link, in his model, is the
accumulation of ¯rm-speci¯c human capital. This insures that wages rise with
tenure. Other mechanisms could simply be that shorter job tenure causes more
disutility amongst workers by making them feel insecure, or that a ¯xed term
contract is really a long period of notice. Thus ¯xed term contracts will give
workers more encouragement to search on-the-job.
By assuming n3 is a measure of the employment in°ow, nin, we can also
recover employment out°ows, nout, as:
nout = nin ¡ net
where net is the net employment change.
The employment °ows are shown in ¯gure 3 below:
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Figure 3: employment °ows
It is clear that the employment °ows are highly trended and positively cor-
related (corr(nin; nout) = 0:95). This positive correlation still shows up when
we detrend the °ows using a HP ¯lter (¸ = 1600) and look at the business cycle
components (corr = 0.58). Further, the total employment in°ow is highly pro-
cyclical (corr(nin; net) = 0:31) and the total employment out°ow is basically
acyclical ( corr(nout; net) = ¡0:01).
We can rearrange equation (1) to express the employment in°ow, nin, into
its constituent parts:
nin = jj + un + ian
It may be interesting to look at the employment °ow which only involves tran-
sitions in and out of unemployment and inactivity, i.e. omitting the job-to-job
°ow element. Let nsemiin and nsemiout be de¯ned respectively as:
nsemiin = un + ian
nsemiout = nu + nai
Where nu is the employment to unemployment °ow, and nai is the employ-
ment to inactivity °ow. Figure 4 illustrates the two °ows. They are negatively
correlated (corr(nsemiin; nsemiout) = ¡0:24), not particularly trended, with
nsemiin highly procyclical (corr(nsemiin; net) = 0:74) and nsemiout highly
counter cyclical (corr(nsemiout; net) = ¡0:63). This contrasts with the prop-
erties of total employment °ows, with the only di®erence between the two being
job-to-job °ows.
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Figure 4: employment °ows, to and from unemployment and inactivity.
Burgess (1994) found something similar for the UK, arguing that the positive
correlation of employment °ows, but the negative correlation of job creation,
jc, and job destruction, jd, implied substantial and procyclical job-to-job °ows.
Or more particularly, substantial job-to-job °ows that do not cause job creation
or job destruction. A number of other studies show similar features: procyclical
employment °ows and asymmetrically cyclical jc and jd °ows4. It is unlikely
that for Spain procyclical job-to-job °ows could explain negatively correlated
employment °ows, to and from unemployment and inactivity; and positively
correlated total employment °ows. As we noted above, jj is procyclical but
more importantly, the increase in temporary contracts has caused a substantial
trend in jj. It is this trend that explains the di®erence in the correlation of the
two sets of employment °ows, and causes total employment °ows to be upwardly
trended.
Finally, we look at unemployment in°ows and out°ows, uin and uout re-
spectively, in Figure 5 below:
4These include Blanchard and Diamond (1990, 1991) and Davis and Haltiwanger for the
US (1996), and Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for France and Germany.
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Figure 5: unemployment °ows
They are negatively correlated, if we take into account a change of regime
at the beginning of 1992, after which the levels of both sets of °ows markedly
increased on average. uout is procyclical (corr(uout; net) = 0:46) and uin coun-
tercyclical (corr(uin; net) = ¡0:42). The change of regime could be consistent
with a change in the law, in 1992, which reduced the generosity of unemploy-
ment bene¯ts and a change in the methodology of the EPA survey, in the ¯rst
quarter of 1992. The correlation and the cyclicality of the °ows is di®erent to
that found for other countries, for which the unemployment °ows are positively
correlated and uout is countercyclical5. The usual explanation for this, is that a
big increase in unemployment, in a recession, outweighs the e®ect of a fall in the
out°ow rate, on the total level of out°ows during a recession. This e®ect does
not appear to be strong for Spain. The reason could be that high ¯ring costs
and a high degree of on-the-job search, reduce the increase of unemployment in
a recession.
In the next section, we build a model to try and replicate some of the cor-
relations noted above.
4 Model with on the job search and ¯ring per-
missions
4.1 Set-up
We build on the search theoretic model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). We
augment the model by adding variables to capture labour market institutions.
First, we add ¯ring permissions as in Garibaldi (1998). These take the form of
a Poisson process: the longer the average wait time, the more binding the ¯r-
ing permission. Second, we add on-the-job search following Mortensen (1994).
5These include the US (see Blanchard and Diamond (1990, 1991)), the UK (see Burgess
1994) and France and Germany (see Burda and Wyplosz (1994)).
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Third, we add other policy variables, such as: lump sum ¯ring costs, unem-
ployment bene¯ts and training costs, to fully capture the richness of e®ects of
institutions on the labour market.
The Mortensen-Pissarides model (MP for short) has two main foundations: a
matching function that characterizes the search and recruiting process by which
new job-worker matches are created, and an idiosyncratic productivity shock
that captures the reason for resource reallocation across alternative activities.
In the labor market, there are ¯rms and there are workers. We assume they are
both risk-neutral and maximize expected returns in output units, discounted at
rate r > 0. Each ¯rm has one job that can be in one of two states, ¯lled and
producing or vacant and searching. Whilst ¯lled, jobs can be actively producing
and pro¯table, or unpro¯table and idle. Jobs are idle while waiting for a ¯ring
permission, whose arrival rate is a Poisson process with average waiting time
of 1s . Once a ¯ring permission arrives, the job is destroyed, unless it receives
a positive productivity shock in the meantime. To destroy the job, the ¯rm
must pay a ¯xed ¯ring cost, T , as well.. Workers can be either unemployed, or
employed and producing. Both can search. Also let ± be the exogenous turnover
rate.
Each job is characterized by a ¯xed irreversible technology and produces a
quantity of goods equal to p + x: p is common to all jobs. x is job speci¯c
and represents an idiosyncratic component of productivity. p is an aggregate
component of productivity that does not a®ect the dispersion of productivity.
A change in p a®ects in a similar way the pro¯tability of all jobs and it is thus
called an aggregate shock. The process that changes the idiosyncratic component
of productivity is assumed to be a Poisson process with rate of arrival ¸: When
there is change, the new value of x is a drawing from the ¯xed distribution F (¢)
which has ¯nite upper support x; and no mass points.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), ¯rms create jobs that have produc-
tivity equal to the upper support of the distribution of productivities p+x: Once
a job is created, however, the ¯rm has no choice over its productivity. Thus job
productivity is a stochastic process, with initial state the upper support of the
distribution and terminal state x · R0 and the arrival of a ¯ring permission.
R0 is the reservation productivity, below which the job is unpro¯table6. Only
the combination of x · R0 and the arrival of a ¯ring permission leads to job de-
struction. This is an important di®erence to the standard MP model, in which
x · R0 leads to immediate job destruction.
As workers are heterogeneous and ¯rms are posting vacancies to operate
speci¯c jobs, matching a worker with a vacancy is costly and requires time.
Because of this, the model is usually closed through a useful tool: the matching
function7, that is a stable, concave, homogenous-of-degree-one aggregate rela-
6Obviously, R0 depends on P .
7See Jackman, Layard and Pissarides (1986), Pissarides (1986), Blanchard and Diamond
(1989,1990) and Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for empirical evidence on the existence of stable
aggregate matching functions. Caballero and Hammour (1990, 1996) show how a matching
function is not required to close the model, as a search theoretic framework just asks for some
mechanism that makes it progressively less pro¯table to post vacancies at a given level of
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tion, H = m(S; V ); linking the pool of searchers (unemployed plus the e®ective
number engaged in on the job search8), S, and the stock of vacancies, V; with
the number of new hirings H. The matching function allows one to represent
two key characteristics of the labour market: the fact that workers and ¯rms
are heterogeneous so that search is costly and time consuming; and the fact
that di®erent ¯rms might compete for the same workers. The transition rate
for vacancies is q (µ) = m(S;V )V = m(
S
V ; 1) = m(
1
µ ; 1); where µ =
V
S ; while the
rate at which job seekers meet vacancies is ® (µ) = m(S;V )S = m(1; µ). Once
the matching has taken place, and the ¯rm and worker have agreed an initial
wage, w0, the ¯rm must pay a set up cost, k, which includes the cost of hiring,
training and other forms of match speci¯c investment.
Whilst unemployed, workers receive unemployment bene¯t. We assume that
these depend on the replacement rate, ¾, and on the general level of productivity,
p. As Pissarides (1999) notes, this is a convenient modelling simpli¯cation,
instead of having bene¯ts as a function of real wages, as it does not sacri¯ce
important generality.
To introduce aggregate shocks, we model p as a jump process characterized
by ´, a Poisson arrival rate, and H : R ¡! [0; 1], a conditional distribution
function. Although simple, this approach captures the main features of cyclical
shocks - there is a positive probability, less than one, that a boom or a recession
will end within a ¯nite period of time.
4.2 Formalities
The assumption that vacancies cost c1 per unit of time, and that jobs are created
at the upper support of the distribution of the productivity distribution, imply
that
rV (p) = ¡c1 + q(µ(p))fJ0(p) ¡ k ¡ V (p)g
where V (p) and J0(p) are respectively the asset values of a vacancy and of a
job just ¯lled: Notice how all the variables to be determined are indexed by
aggregate productivity, as it can vary. As in Pissarides (1990) and Burda and
Wyplosz (1994) jobs are created until the exhaustion of all rents. This implies
the value of posting a vacancy must reach zero, so that the following free entry
condition holds:
c1 = q(µ(p))fJ0(p) ¡ kg (FE)
In other words µ, a measure of market tightness, changes to equate the
expected return and cost of ¯lling a vacancy. Creation costs just reduce the
value of forming a vacancy by k. µ changes via adjustments in vacancies, which
unemployment. In their set up, creation costs provide this.
8The workers are measured in e®ective terms, as the search e±ciency of employees may be
di®erent to that of unemployed searchers. See later discussion.
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is a jump variable. Equation (FE) de¯nes µ as an increasing function of p.
Because the rate at which searching workers ¯nd jobs, ®(µ(p)), is an increasing
function of market tightness, unemployment duration decreases in response to
a positive aggregate shock, as one would expect.
The reservation productivity, R0, is the value of x at which the job becomes
unpro¯table, i.e.
J(R0(p); p) = ¡T (JD)
In other words, jobs become idle when x · R0, or when the asset value of the
job, J(x; p), is less than the cost of ¯ring the worker. Since J(x; p) is generally
increasing in both arguments, R0 is decreasing in p. Thus the °ow into idle jobs
increases as the economy experiences a negative aggregate productivity shock
(p falls).
To complete the characterization of job creation and job destruction, implicit
in equations (FE) and (JD), we need to determine J(x; p). To do this we ¯rst
need to specify the wage bargaining process. Following the search literature, for
example Pissarides (1999), we assume wages are chosen via Nash bargaining. In
this class of wage rules, threat points are equal to the option of looking for an
alternative match partner. The important implication of this type of wage rule,
is that the surplus from a job match is split in a ¯xed proportion between the
worker and the employer. Let W (x; p) denote the asset value of a job match,
with idiosyncratic productivity, x, to an employee and W0(p) the initial value,
before an idiosyncratic shock has hit the job. Further, let U(p) denote the asset
value of being unemployed. From here on, I focus only on the perfect foresight
steady state, where the asset value of posting a vacancy is zero, V = 0. The
initial and continuing surplus in equilibrium are:
S0(p) = J0 ¡ k + W0(p) ¡ U(p) (2)
S(x; p) = J(x; p) + T + W (x; p) ¡ U(p)
The di®erence between the initial wage bargain and subsequent renegotia-
tions arises for two reasons. First, creation costs are `sunk' in the latter case,
but `on the table' in the former. Second, termination costs are not incurred if
no match is formed initially but must be paid if an existing match is destroyed.
The standard Nash bargaining solution is the following:
¯fJ0(p) ¡ kg = (1 ¡ ¯)fW0(p) ¡ U(p)g (3)
¯fJ(x; p) + Tg = (1 ¡ ¯)fW (x; p) ¡ U(p)g (4)
where ¯, the worker's bargaining power is the resulting worker's share of
match surplus.
Given the condition for setting of the reservation productivity R0(p), equa-
tion (JD), and the nash bargaining solutions above, R0(p) is set such that the
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joint net surplus, S(R0(p); p) = 0. For idle jobs, where x < R0(p), S(x; p) < 0.
Given the ¯xed sharing rule implied by nash bargaining, this would imply
W (x; p) < U(p). But this would not be feasible, as the worker would leave
the job, given that the asset value of being unemployed would be higher than
that of working. To make workers participate in idle jobs, we assume that in this
state wages are set such that W (x; p) = U(p). We cannot justify this endoge-
nously, but it seems intuitive as it implies ¯rms are making losses whilst the job
is idle, while workers participate. It is equivalent to setting a wage °oor at the
value of being unemployed and a mechanism to prevent employers' driving down
workers wages, such that they quit voluntarily idle jobs into unemployment.
As in Mortensen (1994) workers search on the job only if the expected gain
from searching exceeds the cost. Assume that on the job search has search
e±ciency ³ and cost c2. On-the-job search takes place if:
³®(µ(p))[W0(p) ¡ fW (x; p) + J(x; p)g] > c2 (5)
The cost has two components: the value for the worker of having the current
job and also the value to the ¯rm of the job. The second component appears as
it can be seen, from the Nash bargaining wage solutions, that:
W (x; p) = ¯S(x; p) + U(p)
Hence, the decision to search or not on-the-job, in order to maximise expected
present value of future earnings, W (x; y), must maximise the joint surplus,
S(x; p). In e®ect, the worker takes into account the cost he imposes on his
current employer by searching on-the-job: it reduces the expected duration of
a match9. Given the asset value of the worker and ¯rm depend positively on
the idiosyncratic part of productivity, x, there exists a second reservation pro-
ductivity, R1(p), below which workers search on the job. Notice that provided
c2 is low enough, R1(p) > R0(p), and some workers in actively producing jobs
will engage in on the job search. Further all workers in idle jobs will search on
the job. This should be expected, as we can think of idle jobs as equivalent to
workers in a period of notice - they will be actively searching for alternatives.
Under the simplifying assumptions made in this paper, quits also induce
job destruction10. This follows from the free entry condition, equation (FE)
and the fact that newly created jobs are assumed to be the most productive.
9This condition for on-the-job search requires a high degree of rationality on behalf of the
worker - he is taking into account the e®ect that his search has on the surplus of the job and
therefore his wages. A simpler rule would be the following ³®(µ(p))[Wo(p) ¡W (x; p)] > c2.
In other words the worker doesn¶t take into account the e®ect his on-the-job search has
on the duration of a match and thus the value of the surplus and his wages. It should be
noted though, given the way the model is calibrated, using this rule instead would not lead
to di®erent results. This simpler rule, ceteris paribus, would imply more quits. Since we
calibrate the model on the number of quits, all that would happen is that c2 would increase
under the simple rule to calibrate the same number of quits. The dynamics of the simulations
would not be a®ected and thus the results would not qualititavely di®er.
10we will discuss the implications of this later, when we simulate the model for a US baseline
economy and try to match the correlations the model produces, with those inherent in the
data.
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This implies the value of a job just quit, will be less than the cost of posting a
vacancy, c1.
Job destruction also occurs when idle jobs receive ¯ring permissions and
there is exogenous turnover. The level of job destruction is thus:
jd(p) = sI + ±N + Q (6)
where I is the stock of idle jobs, N is the stock of employed workers and Q is
the number of job-to-job quits. Similarly, job creation is simply the job ¯nding
rate multiplied by the stock of searchers:
jc(p) = ®(µ(p))S = ®(µ(p))U + Q (7)
4.2.1 The equilibrium surplus value of a match
We now have all the tools to write down the asset °ows equations. The value of
a match, facing idiosyncratic and aggregate components of productivity x and
p respectively, to an employer, J(x; p), is de¯ned by:
rJ(x; p) = p + x ¡ w(x; p) ¡ Á(R1(p) > x)³®(µ(p))J(x; p)
+ ¸
Z
fJ(y; p) ¡ J(x; p)gdF (y) + ´
Z
fJ(x; z) ¡ J(x; p)gdH(z=p)
+ sfmax(¡T; J(x; p)) ¡ J(x; p)g ¡ ±J(x; p) (assetj)
The ¯rst line, equals the current pro¯t less an allowance for the expected
loss attributable to the possibility that the worker in the match quits. w(x; p) is
current state contingent wage received. Á is an indicator function that takes a
value of one for R1 > x and zero otherwise. In other words, it represents when
employees decide to search on-the-job. The second line represents the expected
changes in the value of the employer's state, associated with the possible arrival
of a new job-speci¯c, or aggregate shock respectively. The ¯nal line takes into
account the possible and necessary arrival of a ¯ring permission, along with
exogenous quits. In this model, ¯ring has two elements: the wait for a permis-
sion and then the payment of a lump sum tax. An important di®erence to the
standard MP model is that the expected changes in the value of the employer's
state, due to the arrival of a shock, are calculated across the entire distribution
of idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity, respectively. This is because job
destruction does not happen immediately when a shock, idiosyncratic or aggre-
gate, hits a job such that x < R0(p) and J(x; p) < 0. This is due to the need
for ¯ring permissions. In the MP model J(x; p) is bounded above zero, as job
destruction can happen immediately when a shock hits that makes x < R0(p).
Similarly, the value of the same match to an employed worker, W (x; p), is
de¯ned by:
rW(x; p) = w(x; p) + Á(R1(p) > x)[³®(µ(p))fW0(p) ¡ W (x; p)g ¡ c2]
+ ¸
Z
fW (y; p) ¡ W (x; p)gdF (y) + ´
Z
fW(x; z) ¡ W (x; p)gdH(z=p)
+ sÁ(R0(p) > x)fU(p) ¡ W(x; p)g + ±fU(p) ¡ W (x; p)g (assetw)
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The ¯rst line is the sum of the current state contingent wage and the expected
capital gain associated with on the job search. The second line represents the
expected changes in the value of the employed worker's state associated with
the possible arrival of a new job-speci¯c, or aggregate, shock respectively, and is
analogous to the expected changes for an employer. Notice again how the ex-
pected changes in the value of the employed worker's state, due to the arrival of
a shock, are calculated across the entire distribution of idiosyncratic and aggre-
gate productivity, respectively. The third line, has exactly same interpretation
as that given for the employer's asset equation.
Finally the value of being unemployed is given by:
rU(p) = b + ¾p + ®(µ(p))fW0(p) ¡ U(p)g + ´
Z
fU(z) ¡ U(p)gdH(z=p)
(assetu)
The ¯rst term is the utility of leisure and the second captures unemployment
bene¯ts. The third represents the expected gain of ¯nding a job and the fourth
the expected change in value due to an aggregate productivity shock.
Summing up asset equations (assetj) (assetw) and (assetu) and making use
of the nash bargaining equations (3) and (4), we can show that the surplus value
function S(x; p) satis¯es:
fr + ¸ + ± + ´ + sÁ(R0(p) > x)gS(x; p) = x + y
+ Á(R1(p) > x)[³®(µ(p))f¯S0(p) ¡ S(x; p) + Tg ¡ c2] + (r + ±)T
¡ b ¡ ®(µ(p))S0(p) + ¸
Z
S(y; p)dF (y) +
Z
S(x; z)dH(z=p) (assets)
S0(p) = S(x; p) ¡ T ¡ k (11)
where S0(p) is the surplus of a just ¯lled job, i.e. one that has not been hit
by an idiosyncratic shock. The equilibrium surplus value, of a match for given
(x; y), is the solution to equation (assets).
4.3 Solving the model
Given the solutions to the wage bargaining problem, the free-entry and reser-
vation productivity conditions can be respectively re-written as:
®(µ(p))
µ(p)
f(1 ¡ ¯)S0(p)g = c1 (12)
S(R0(p); R1(p); p) = 0 (13)
³®(µ(p))[¯S0(p) ¡ S(R0(p); R1(p); p) + T ] ¡ c2 = 0 (14)
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The ¯rst condition is the free-entry condition and determines the number of
vacancies a ¯rm would like to advertise. The next two conditions determine the
level of idiosyncratic productivity below which the ¯rm would like to destroy
jobs, R0(p), and workers would like to search on the job, R1(p). An equilibrium
is a solution to the above three conditions, equations (12) (13) and (14); along
with a solution to the surplus value function, equations (assets) and (11), for all
values of p. Mortensen(1994) develops a method for solving such a non linear
system, once the model has been calibrated and if we approximate the aggregate
shock process by a ¯nite Markov chain. This is the method used to solve the
model in this paper, and interested readers are referred to the aforementioned
paper for more detail. Once the model has been solved, it is then straightforward
to simulate the model and recover the dynamics of employment, unemployment,
job and worker °ows.
4.4 The dynamics of job and worker °ows
Given a generated series of aggregate productivity states, we can simulate the
above model and derive the dynamics of the labour market. Both the idiosyn-
cratic productivity component, x, and market tightness, µ, are forward-looking
jump variables. On the other hand, due to the time it takes to match work-
ers with jobs, unemployment and employment are sticky variables. Thus to
implement the model, we need to specify its dynamic behaviour at a discrete
time t = 0; 1; :::; ¿ . For this purpose, it is necessary to keep track of the entire
distribution of employment over x. Consider the distribution of x split into
2z intervals x ² [ai; ai¡1); i = 1; 2; ::::::2z + 1; and ai¡1 > ai. z is the num-
ber of possible aggregate productivity states in the Markov chain11. Following
Mortensen (1994), we assume that the aggregate shock is completely revealed
at the beginning of each period. In the time interval between t and t+1; R0(pt),
R1(pt) and µ(pt) are state variables determined at the beginning of time t and
stay constant throughout. If Nt measures employment at the end of period t,
then Nt = It + Ot, where It indicates idle jobs waiting for a ¯ring permission
and Ot are operational jobs that will ignore the arrival of a ¯ring permission.
Let nit be the measure of workers employed in jobs within interval [ai; ai¡1) at
the end of period t. The distribution's law of motion, is given by the following:
nit =
8>>>>>><>>>>>:
(1 ¡ ± ¡ ¸)nit¡1 + ¸[F (ai¡1) ¡ F (ai)]Nt¡1
if x > ai ¸ R1(pt¡1)
(1 ¡ ± ¡ ¸)nit¡1 + ¸[F (ai¡1) ¡ F (ai)]Nt¡1 ¡ ³®(µ(pt¡1))nit¡1
if R1(pt¡1) > ai ¸ R0(pt¡1)
(1 ¡ ± ¡ ¸)nit¡1 + ¸[F (ai¡1) ¡ F (ai)]Nt¡1 ¡ ³®(µ(pt¡1))nit¡1
¡snit¡1 if R0(pt¡1) > ai
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
(15)
112z intervals are chosen over x because as Mortensen(1994) shows, the Surplus value func-
tion, S(x; y), is a contraction that maps a set of piecewise linear functions, in x; with 2z kinks
at the values of x equal to the elements of R0 and R1, into itself. The intervals, are simply
the distribution over x split by the kink points.
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The laws of motion are self explanatory. The °ow out of nit consists of:
exogenous turnover; the possibility of an idiosyncratic shock; if ai < R1(pt¡1),
job to job quits; and if ai < R0(pt¡1), job destruction when a ¯ring permission
arrives. The °ow into nit is simply the chance that a job is hit by an idiosyncratic
shock within the interval [ai; ai¡1).
To evaluate the laws for job creation and job destruction, equations (7)
(6) respectively, we need to keep track of the switch in the composition of
employment between operational and idle jobs, and the number of endogenous
quits.
If we de¯ne Iinf t as the in°ow into the idle state during period t, it follows
that:
Iinf t = ¸F (R0(pt¡1))fNt¡1 ¡ It¡1g + Á(R0(pt¡1) ¸ R0(pt¡2))
R0(pt¡1)Z
R0(pt¡2)
nit¡1di
(iinf)
where again, Á is an indicator function that takes value of one if the interior
inequality is satis¯ed and zero otherwise. Jobs °ows into the idle state for two
reasons: either an idiosyncratic shock below the current reservation productivity
hits the job or the aggregate state worsens and makes idle all those jobs whose
productivity lies between the two states. Similarly, if we de¯ne Ioutt to be the
out°ow from the idle state during period t:
Ioutt = [¸f1 ¡ F (R0(pt¡1))g + s]It¡1
+ Á(R0(pt¡2) > R0(pt¡1)
R0(pt¡2)Z
R0(pt¡1)
nit¡1di + ³®(µ(pt¡1))It¡1 + ±It¡1 (iout)
Jobs leave the idle state for ¯ve reasons: a positive idiosyncratic shock makes
jobs fully operational; ¯ring permissions arrive; positive aggregate shock makes
all jobs between the two reservation productivities fully operational; job to job
quits and exogenous turnover. Given the °ows in equations (iinf) and (iout) it
is obvious that:
It = Iinf t ¡ Ioutt + It¡1
Qt, the level of endogenous job to job °ows during period t is given by:
Qt =
X
i
³®(µ(pt¡1))Á(R1(pt¡1) > ai)nit¡1
This is simply the sum, over all intervals of x, of the job-to-job °ows in each
interval.
Thus job destruction in period t:
jdt = sIt¡1 + ±Nt¡1 + Qt
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is now fully speci¯ed. As is job creation in period t:
jct = ®(µ(pt¡1))f1 ¡ Nt¡1g + Qt
Obviously, the end of the period employment is:
Nt = Nt¡1 + jct ¡ jdt
Notice that, since we have no inactive state in the model, unemployment
in°ows and out°ows are simply given by int = jdt ¡ Qt and outt = jct ¡
Qt respectively. These are also equivalent to employment out°ows and in°ows,
which do not involve job-to-job °ows, respectively. To get measures compa-
rable to those of Davis and Haltiwanger, we normalise in; out; jd and jc by
Nt+Nt¡1
2 . We also measure the out°ow rate as, outrt =
outt
Ut¡1 . Finally, we use
net employment changes: nett = Nt ¡ Nt¡1 as a measure of the cycle.
5 Comparative Statics in a calibrated model
The theoretical consequences of either: more on-the-job search; or ¯ring per-
missions arriving more quickly, are di±cult to determine. More on-the-job
search implies a smaller role for job destruction, through unemployment, in the
reallocation of labour from less to more productive activity. However on-the-
job search also reduces the expected duration of a match, and thus also a®ects
the incentives to create and destroy jobs. A similar problem arises with ¯r-
ing permissions. For this reason, both Mortensen (1994) and Garibaldi (1998)
use simulations to provide information about the e®ects of a change in these
variables. We follow the same procedure here. Before simulating the model,
we need to calibrate it. Many recent papers (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
Mortensen (1994) and Cole and Rogerson (1998)) have argued that a variant
of the search model exposed to aggregate shocks can perform well in matching
business cycle facts for the US. For this reason and also for the ease of compar-
ison with other studies, we do the comparative statics exercises for the model,
calibrated on the US economy.
5.1 Calibration for a US economy
To model the evolution of aggregate productivity, we follow previous studies
in this area (Mortensen (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Millard,
Mortensen and Rosenblat (1996)) and suppose that the aggregate productivity
follows the following ¯rst order autoregressive process:
pt = ½pt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)¹ + Àt with E(À2t ) = ¾2À
We follow Millard, Mortensen and Rosenblat (1996) in setting ½ and ¾À to
equal 0.95 and 0.047 respectively12. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) show
12These values were chosen so that the autocorrelation and variance of aggregate consump-
tion in the calibrated model, matched that in detrended data for the US, as reported by Merz
(1994).
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how a continuous Markov process can be approximated as a ¯nite state Markov
chain. Mortensen (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) use a three state
approximation. We use nine states, as Millard, Mortensen and Rosenblat (1996)
show that simulated results for unemployment tend to be very jerky, when
compared to the data, if the number of states is small.
A matching function of the Cobb-Douglas form is assumed with elasticity
with respect to vacancies equal to #, i.e. q(µ) = µ¡#. We set # = 0:6 following
Blanchard and Diamond (1990). The distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is
assumed to be uniform on the support [°; 1], i.e. F (x) = x¡°1¡° 8 x ² [°; 1]. We
set the worker's share of the Nash Bargain, equal to the average wage share,
from 1960-98, ¯ = 0:713. The replacement ratio is set to equal the average
gross replacement rate over the period, as calculated by the OECD, ¾ = 0:1.
We set the lump sum ¯ring cost to be zero, as in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998). We also set the arrival rate of ¯ring permissions, s = 1. Thus on
average one ¯ring permission arrives per period and the economy performs in
a similar way to if there was no need to wait for a ¯ring permission. The
parameters chosen for the ¯ring procedure, re°ect that ¯ring is neither costly
nor time consuming in the US. The arrival rate of an idiosyncratic shock, ¸,
the interest rate, r, the training cost, k, and the recruiting cost c1, are the
same as those justi¯ed in Mortensen and Millard (1997). The value of leisure,
b, the lower bound of the idiosyncratic shock distribution, °, and the e±ciency
of on the job search, ³, are chosen so that the calibrated model, on average,
matches certain features of the US economy. In particular, that it matches: an
unemployment rate and duration of 6% and 3 months respectively, which are
post WWII averages; and that job to job °ows are about 50% of hires from
unemployment (see Blanchard and Diamond 1990). The simulations are carried
out over 100 quarters and repeated 100 times. The institutional values for this
baseline economy are summarised below:
¸ = 0:107; ° = 0; r = 0:01; ± = 0:14; ¯ = 0:7
# = 0:6; ¾ = 0:1; T = 0; k = 0:275; c1 = 0:33
b = 1:05; ³ = 0:36; s = 1
5.2 Results for a baseline economy
We present the simulated results for the baseline economy, and correlations
found in US data, in Table 1. The results for comparative statics exercises
on: changes in the on-the-job search e±ciency; changes the arrival rate of ¯ring
permissions; and changes in the replacement ratio are documented in Tables
1-3.
The results in Table 1, replicate some of the results found in the data
and Mortensen (1994), namely: the positive correlation between unemployment
in°ows and out°ows; the negative correlation between unemployment and va-
cancies (the Beveridge curve); and the negative correlation between job creation
13We use ameco data, which is adjusted for self employment.
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and job destruction. Unfortunately, as in Mortensen (1994), the standard errors
associated with the correlation of the °ows, are high relative to the actual esti-
mates. The mean rates of job creation and job destruction, at around 8.7% are
higher than the ranges estimated by Blanchard and Portugal (2000), which are
6-7.2% and 6.3-7.6% respectively. These ranges are based on the manufacturing
numbers estimated by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) for 1977q2 - 1988q4 and
a correction to elevate the numbers to represent the whole economy. There is
a range of values due to uncertainty about the elevation factor. One simple
explanation of the di®erences, could simply be that our simple model does not
di®erentiate between worker °ows and job °ows. All out°ows lead to job de-
struction, as do all job-to-job quits. Yet as Blanchard and Portugal (2000) note,
many separations are not due to desired changes in the level of employment of
the ¯rm, but due to match-speci¯c problems. Thus, worker °ows typically ex-
ceed job °ows. Blanchard and Portugal estimate, for the US, that the ratio of
worker to job °ows is in the range 1.4-2.2. Thus if we make a downward ad-
justment to the °ows generated by the model, to take account of the di®erences
between worker and job °ows, we would get numbers closer to those estimated
by Blanchard and Portugal.
5.2.1 Changes in the degree of on-the-job search
Table 1 illustrates the correlations once we vary the e±ciency of on the job
search, ³. The levels of unemployment in°ows and out°ows fall as ³ rises. This
is unsurprising: job destruction leading to unemployment is less frequent, as
many workers quit for another job before their current job is destroyed. Further,
as Mortensen (1994) notes though, the `crowding out' e®ect of an increase in
employed worker search on the job ¯nding probability of unemployed workers
(see Burgess (1994) and Pissarides (1994)) is absent in this model. This is due
to: 1) the complementarity between vacancy seeking workers and worker seeking
vacancies, in the matching function; and 2) the free entry condition, equation
(FE), which together imply that vacancies respond in proportion to o®set such
a congestion. Thus the level of unemployment falls as ³ rises, due to the above
mentioned fall in the in°ow rate, as illustrated in Tables 1-3. This itself will
lead to lower out°ows, as the out°ow rate is not changing due to the lack of a
congestion e®ect. The fact that the duration of unemployment hardly changes,
as ³ varies, illustrates that the out°ow rate is not changing14.
The standard deviation of unemployment rises though. This is because the
standard deviation of in°ows increases. The intuition is the following: the
higher is ³, the bigger fall in job-to-job °ows in a recession, due to its procyclical
nature. This implies more jobs will become idle, before a worker quits. This,
ceteris paribus, will increase the level of in°ows in a recession. The opposite
e®ect will happen in a boom, and given that in°ows are counter-cyclical, this
will increase its standard deviation. It will also increase its degree of counter-
cyclicality, which is con¯rmed by looking at the changes in corr(net; in). This
14the out°ow rate is simply the inverse of the duration of unemployment.
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also ties in with Burgess (1994), who argues that an increase in on-the-job search
should increase the cyclicality of in°ows. But, as argued above, the `crowding
out' e®ect that leads to the out°ow rate becoming less cyclical in Burgess's
analysis, is not present here. The simulations seem to suggest that the cyclical
nature of the out°ow rate has a non-linear response to an increase in ³: at ¯rst
corr(net; outr) rises and then it falls.
It should also be noted, that the negative correlation between unemployment
and vacancies becomes less strong as ³ increases. This is not surprising: as ³
increases, vacancies become more responsive to on-the-job searchers rather than
unemployed searchers.
5.2.2 Changes in the arrival rate of ¯ring permissions
Table 2 documents the results, once we change the arrival rate of ¯ring per-
missions, s. A fall in s reduces both unemployment and its standard deviation.
The e®ect on the standard deviation is not a surprise - we would expect it to
fall as the process of ¯ring becomes more uncertain, because ¯rms cannot re-
act as quickly to a shock. The fall in unemployment illustrates that the fall in
the in°ow rate is more important than the fall in the out°ow rate. In fact the
out°ow rate hardly changes - the duration of unemployment is more or less con-
stant. The number of job-to-job °ows increases as s falls. This is because more
people will be in idle jobs and all of the workers in this category will be search-
ing on-the-job, as R1 > R0. This ties in with the evidence of Boeri (1999),
that countries with stricter ¯ring restrictions have higher job-to-job °ows. Even
though job-to-job °ows increase as s falls, job creation and job destruction fall,
as unemployment °ows fall more than job-to-job °ows rise. Thus the economy
is becoming more sclerotic and less e±cient as ¯ring permissions take longer to
get: it cannot reallocate labour as e®ectively in reaction to shocks. This ties in
with the conclusions of Bentolila and Bertola (1990). As in Garibaldi (1998)
the standard deviation of destruction falls. Also, the counter-cyclicality of the
unemployment in°ows falls. This is because it takes longer for ¯rms to get rid
of workers in a recession and ¯rms anticipating this, realise ¯ring permissions
at higher levels of idiosyncratic productivity.
Finally, it is worth noting that as s falls, job creation and job destruction
become increasingly positively correlated. This seems strange, as a major
reason why Mortensen (1994) introduced on-to-job search, was to account for
positively correlated unemployment °ows and negatively correlated job creation
and job destruction, in the US. The reason we now have both sets of °ows being
positively correlated is intriguing and is the following. The introduction of pro-
cyclical job-to-job °ows allows unemployment out°ows to be counter-cyclical,
but job creation to be pro-cyclical. Normally with a high arrival rate of ¯ring
permissions, unemployment in°ows are highly counter-cyclical and thus job de-
struction remains counter-cyclical. However, we noted above, that when ¯ring
permissions arrive very infrequently, the counter-cyclicality of unemployment
in°ows is greatly reduced. Thus job destruction could now even be pro-cyclical
if job-to-job °ows, which induce job destruction, are su±ciently pro-cyclical.
23
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO nº 0102
Thus job °ows could be positively correlated. To surmise, if ¯ring permis-
sions are su±ciently hard to get and on-the-job search very active, we can have
positively correlated job creation and job destruction.
5.2.3 Changes in the replacement ratio
Table 3 shows the results of a change in the replacement ratio, which we brie°y
discuss below. An increase in ¾ increases unemployment signi¯cantly and its du-
ration, as expected. The level of creation and destruction doesn¶t change much,
but the balance between in°ows/out°ows and job-to-job °ows does. Job-to-job
°ows fall as ¾ increases, but in°ows and out°ows increase. The reason why
job-to-job °ows fall, is that as ¾ rises, unemployment becomes less uncomfort-
able and so workers are more willing to have a period of unemployment between
jobs. In°ows and out°ows increase, as though the out°ow rate falls (duration
increases), the increase in the level of unemployment more than compensates
for this fall.
In the next section, we perform a full simulation for Spain and try to explain
its recent history of high unemployment.
6 A simulated model for Spain
As documented in section 2, it seems that the introduction of temporary con-
tracts has led to a marked increase in job-to-job °ows, in Spain. As well as
leading to a reduction in ¯ring costs, they seem to have led to an increase in
on-the-job search. In this section, we calibrate a search theoretic model, for
the period 1977-1999, allowing for a structural break in 1984 when temporary
contracts were introduced, and simulate it for Spain. Given the discussion in
section 2, the structural break allows for: ¯ring costs to fall; on-the-job search
to become more active and unemployment bene¯ts to increase.
We keep the same Markov chain process for aggregate productivity as as-
sumed for the calibration of a US economy. We also assume the same ¸, °, r, #,
±, k and c1 as before. We take ¯ to be the average of the wage share from 1977-
1998, i.e. around 75%15. We use the gross replacement ratio, as estimated by
the OECD, as our value for ¾. For 1977-84 it is around 25% and from 1985-99,
it is 35%. This ¯ts in with the discussion in the introduction to this paper -
overall for the second period, the various changes in bene¯t laws have increased
the e®ective level of bene¯ts whilst unemployed. We choose the rest of the
parameters to ¯t: the level of the NAIRU; the duration of unemployment; and
job-to-job °ows, as a percentage of employment in°ows.
Estrada, Hernando and Lopez-Salido (2000) have recently come up with
some new estimates of the NAIRU. We use these in our calibrations. Thus we
set the NAIRU for 1977-84 at around 15% and for 1985-99 at around 18%.
The average duration of unemployment, for the period 1987-99, is 4.5 quarters,
15again using ameco data.
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according to the EPA gross °ow data. We use this estimate for the period 1985-
99. Unfortunately, for the period 1977-1984, no available comparable EPA
gross °ow data exists, thus we have to make a reasoned estimate. An often
quoted ¯gure for duration in continental European countries is 3 quarters (see
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998, 1999)). Given that, within a country, duration
tends to increase with the unemployment rate, this seems a reasonable estimate
for the period 1977-1984. We estimated, in section 2, that the mean percentage
of job-to-job °ows was around 42%, for the period 1988-1999. Given that this
series shows an upward trend, a fair estimate for the period 1985-1999 may
be that a third of the in°ow into employment was caused by job-to-job °ows.
For the period 1977-84, there will have been some job-to-job °ows, though
not many. Given the upward trend of job-to-job °ows commented on earlier,
possibly around 10% of the employment in°ow would have been made up of
job-to-job °ows.
For 1977-1984, we set ³, T , b, and s to calibrate the estimated NAIRU,
duration and job-to-job °ows for that period. For 1985-1999, we keep b constant,
but allow ³, T and s to change and calibrate the changes in the NAIRU, duration
and job-to-job °ows. All the parameters are summarised below:
¸ = 0:107; ° = 0; r = 0:01; ± = 0:14; ¯ = 0:75
# = 0:6; k = 0:275; c = 0:33, b = 1:32;
¾ = 0:25(pre85) and 0:35(post85);
T = 1(pre85) and 0:5(post85);
³ = 0:09(pre85) and 0:7(post85);
s = 0:25(pre85) and 0:75(post85)
Notice how the calibrated changes ¯t in with our perception of the changes in
the Spanish labour market. Namely, increased unemployment bene¯ts, reduced
¯ring costs (both lump sum and over time) and increased on the job search
activity. Given the calibration procedure, it will make little di®erence that
estimating some of the parameters has involved reasoned guesswork, provided
the direction, and magnitude of the changes are credible.
6.1 Results for Spain
The results are presented in Table 4, along with a comparison with the corre-
lations in the data. There are interesting di®erences between the two periods.
The levels of in°ows and out°ows are more or less the same. This is due to the
e®ects of the changes more or less cancelling each other out. The increase in
the arrival rate of ¯ring permissions will increase both out°ows and in°ows, as
will the increase in the replacement rate. Whereas the increase in on-the-job
search e±ciency will reduce both of them, as shown in section 4. The level of
the °ows, at around 6% of employment, is consistent with the evidence docu-
mented in section 2. nsemiout and nsemiin, once normalised by the level of
employment, are more or less equivalent to in°ows and out°ows in the model:
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they measure employment °ows that do not involve job-to-job °ows. The mean
value of these, from the EPA gross °ow data, is respectively 5.8% and 5.2%.
Out°ows are highly procyclical across both periods, but in°ows become in-
creasingly countercyclical. This is not surprising given the e®ects we noted of
an increase in s and ³ in section 2. These cyclical properties for the second
period are consistent with the properties of: nsemiout, nsemiin, uout and u in.
The unemployment °ows have the same cyclical properties as the employment
°ows without job-to-job °ows. One di®erence between the data and the sim-
ulation is that corr(in; out) > 0 in the simulations, but corr(u in; uout) < 0
and corr(nsemiin; nsemiout) < 0 in the data. It should be noted though, that
the standard deviation associated with the simulated statistic corr(in; out) is
actually greater than the observed value. Therefore it could be consistent to
have a corr(in; out) < 0 in reality, given the simulation results.
The level of creation and destruction is higher in the second period than
the ¯rst, due to higher job-to-job °ows. Even though the average level of un-
employment is higher, the lowering of ¯ring costs and increasing on-the- job
search activity may have made the economy less sclerotic - the economy real-
locates labour in reaction to shocks more quickly. The level, in the second
period, of job °ows at around 9%, is much higher than the ¯gure estimated by
Dolado and G¶omez (1995) on data, from the Central de Balances del Banco de
Espana, for the period 1984-1992. They come up with a ¯gure of around 3% for
job creation and 4% for job destruction annually. However, Diaz-Moreno and
Galdon-Sanchez (1998) argue that the values produced by Dolado and G¶omez
(1995) may be seriously biased downwards, as they refer to large manufacturing
¯rms only. They use data from the Spanish Social Security Census and get much
larger °ows. Also there is the issue that we touched on when discussing the
US results - not all job-to-job °ows will cause job creation and job destruction.
Thus the real level of job creation and job destruction will probably be less than
predicted by the model. The cyclical properties of job creation and job destruc-
tion from the simulations are similar to the results of Dolado and Gomez (1995).
Namely job creation is pro-cyclical and job destruction is counter-cyclical. The
cyclicality of job destruction becomes more pronounced in the second period,
as expected due to in°ows becoming more countercyclical.
7 A sequence of events for Spain
In section 5, we have shown how a calibrated search model can deliver the
high degree of unemployment experienced by Spain, since the late 1970s, and
the explain some of the dynamic correlations in the data. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, it is not di±cult for a model with: a reduction in ¯ring costs; an increase
in on-the-job search and an increase in bene¯ts, to calibrate a higher average
level of unemployment, post 1984, than before. The introduction of temporary
contracts reduced the level of ¯ring costs and increased the level of on-the-job
search. But the e®ect of these two changes on the level of unemployment is
ambiguous. The comparative statics exercises in section 4, suggest that an
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increase in the arrival rate of ¯ring permissions may increase average unemploy-
ment, whereas an increase in on-the-job search, may reduce unemployment. The
comparative statics exercises also suggest that an increase in the e®ective level
of bene¯ts for the unemployed results in a large increase in the unemployment
level. The combination of the three e®ects led to an increase in the average level
of unemployment in the post 1984 period.
Though the average level of unemployment has been higher in the post 1984
period, there has been a large fall in unemployment since 1994. What can
explain this? The sequencing of the reforms is obviously important. The laws in
1984 and 1989, to increase the generosity of unemployment bene¯ts, along with
the reduction in ¯ring costs and cyclical factors, can probably help explain the
build up of unemployment to a peak of 24% in the ¯rst quarter of 1994. In 1992
though bene¯t laws were tightened, as a consequence of a crisis in the funding
of Social Security. This tightening, combined with increase in on-the-job search
and cyclical factors, probably interacted to help reduce the unemployment rate,
from a peak of 24% to just under 15% in the second quarter of 2000.
It is very important to di®erentiate between e®ects on the level of unemploy-
ment and the e±ciency of the labour market (see Bentolila and Bertola (1990)).
The reduction in ¯ring costs and increase in job-to-job °ows have probably in-
creased the level of e±ciency in the labour market - levels of job creation and
job destruction in the model increase.
One ¯nal point to mention, is the value of leisure, b, is estimated to be
higher in Spain than in the US, in the simulation exercises performed earlier.
For Spain, b = 1:32 and for the US, b = 1:05. One hypothesis could be that
measured household production is higher in Spain. Campbell and Ludvigson
(2000) argue that it is natural to think of home production as a part of measured
leisure, instead of an alternative. In Spain there has been a lot of debate about
the black economy, or la economia sumergida. Many have argued that in areas
such as Andalucia, where the unemployment in parts reaches 30%, this kind
of activity is large. Given that people working in the underground economy,
will still be claiming unemployment bene¯t, we can think of the activity as
measured home production, i.e. as part of measured leisure. This may have had
the unforeseen e®ect of increasing the measured utility of being unemployed and
therefore increasing the level of measured unemployment.
8 Conclusions
For many economists, the degree of the structural unemployment problem, in
Spain, has been a puzzle. This is especially apparent when comparing Spain
with Portugal - a country with a similar historical legacy and with seemingly
similar labour market institutions (see Blanchard and Jimeno (1995)). In this
paper, we have considered the e®ects of: ¯rst, the interaction of the introduc-
tion of ¯xed term contracts and on-the-job search ; and second, the changes
in the generosity of bene¯ts. We have simulated a search theoretic model,
with on-the-job search and ¯ring permissions, to illustrate that these e®ects can
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easily calibrate an increase in the structural level of unemployment in Spain,
since 1984. At the same time, they may have increased the e±ciency of the
labour market - post 1984 Spain may be an economy more capable of reallocat-
ing labour in response to shocks. It should be noted though, that since 1992,
when unemployment bene¯t laws were tightened, the equilibrium level of unem-
ployment has probably fallen whilst the economy has continued to become less
dynamically sclerotic. Further, other factors have probably been important in
explaining the evolution of the Spanish labour market, for example: the system
of collective bargaining and employment taxes. In this paper, we have simply
shown that a combination of changes in: ¯ring costs, unemployment bene¯ts
and on-the-job search may make the Spanish jigsaw that is unemployment, a
bit less of a puzzle.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Construction of °ow data
The data come from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA: Encuesta de la
Poblaci¶on Activa). The EPA is a survey on all members of around 60,000
households (approximately 200,000 persons each quarter). Consecutive waves
of EPA are matched to obtain °ow data. To make the data representative of
the total population, we elevate by the appropriate factors.
Two large problems with surveys like the EPA are sample attrition and miss-
classi¯cation error. Sample attrition occurs when a household unit, which in
principle should be covered by the survey, does not respond to the survey. Avail-
able Spanish evidence (INE (1996)) suggest that between 6-8% of the sample
cannot be matched across consecutive periods. To the extent that the attri-
tion is not random, it can cause unadjusted labour market °ows to be biased.
Miss-classi¯cation errors arise as a result of respondent errors miss-coding or in-
terview errors. As Blanchard and Portugal (2000) note, these problems, which
will lead to spurious transitions, are likely to be more serious with cumulated
monthly transitions than with quarterly transitions. Artola and Bell (1999)
analyse this issue in detail for Spain.
9.2 Employment °ow data
We use two sources of data: the gross °ow transitions collated by EPA, by
matching individual records over time; and the EPA o±cial measure of employ-
ment less than three months. The o±cial measure of employment less than
3 months is used as a proxy for the total employment in°ow. The gross °ow
transitions give us an individual breakdown of the transitions in and out of em-
ployment, to and from unemployment or inactivity. They can be summed up
to give us the net employment °ow, excluding job-to-job °ows.
9.3 Unemployment °ow data
Again the gross °ow transitions are the source. There are two main °ows into
unemployment: from employment and from inactivity. These °ows are summed
to give us the total unemployment in°ow. The unemployment out°ow is con-
structed in exactly the same manner: we sum the °ows from unemployment
into inactivity and employment.
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simulation stats - varying ³
baseline ³ = 0:6 ³ = 0:05 data
mean(out) 5:78
(0:33)
4:16
(0:39)
8:73
(0:13)
3.07-4.27a
mean(in) 5:78
(0:33)
4:16
(0:39)
8:73
(0:13)
3.37-4.76a
mean(quits) 2:93
(0:23)
5:07
(0:34)
0:39
(0:05)
2.93b
sd(out) 0:76
(0:20)
1:21
(0:86)
0:47
(0:06)
sd(in) 0:68
(0:14)
1:09
(0:57)
0:30
(0:04)
corr(net; outr) 0:75
(0:10)
0:63
(0:43)
0:59
(0:11)
corr(net; in) ¡0:57
(0:11)
¡0:69
(0:14)
¡0:41
(0:06)
corr(jc; jd) ¡0:23
(0:19)
¡0:49
(0:22)
0:09
(0:07)
-0.36c
corr(net; quits) 0:18
(0:07)
0:28
(0:15)
0:03
(0:05)
corr(in; out) 0:23
(0:28)
0:01
(0:40)
0:20
(0:09)
0.16d
corr(u; v) ¡0:71
(0:31)
¡0:37
(0:57)
¡0:94
(0:03)
-0.88e
mean(u) 5:95
(0:79)
4:34
(0:74)
8:74
(0:79)
6.00f
sd(u) 1:14
(0:32)
1:42
(0:60)
1:04
(0:33)
1.49f
mean(duration) 1:09
(0:09)
1:07
(0:09)
1:10
(0:09)
1.00d
Table 1: results (mean values with s.ds in brackets) for a US economy, varying
the e±ciency of on-the-job search, simulated 100 times over 100 quarters . Data
Sources: aBlanchard and Portugal (2000) once quits have been taken away;
bBlanchard and Diamond (1990); cDavis and Haltiwanger (1992); dMortensen
(1994); eMertz (1992); fComputed from U.S unemployment 1960:1 - 1999:3.
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simulation stats - varying s
baseline s = 0:5 s = 0:1 data
mean(out) 5:78
(0:33)
4:75
(0:28)
2:56
(0:12)
3.07-4.27a
mean(in) 5:78
(0:33)
4:75
(0:28)
2:56
(0:12)
3.37-4.76a
mean(quits) 2:93
(0:23)
3:08
(0:20)
3:37
(0:11)
2.93b
sd(out) 0:76
(0:20)
0:51
(0:10)
0:21
(0:04)
sd(in) 0:68
(0:14)
0:39
(0:09)
0:16
(0:05)
corr(net; outr) 0:75
(0:10)
0:66
(0:12)
0:60
(0:12)
corr(net; in) ¡0:57
(0:11)
¡0:25
(0:11)
0:01
(0:11)
corr(jc; jd) ¡0:23
(0:19)
0:38
(0:18)
0:93
(0:05)
-0.36c
corr(net; quits) 0:18
(0:07)
0:21
(0:07)
0:55
(0:12)
corr(in; out) 0:23
(0:28)
0:65
(0:16)
0:77
(0:09)
0.16d
corr(u; v) ¡0:71
(0:31)
¡0:87
(0:15)
¡0:89
(0:08)
-0.88e
mean(u) 5:95
(0:79)
4:94
(0:67)
2:71
(0:34)
6.00f
sd(u) 1:14
(0:32)
0:88
(0:30)
0:42
(0:16)
1.49f
mean(duration) 1:09
(0:09)
1:08
(0:09)
1:08
(0:09)
1.00d
Table 2: results (mean values with s.ds in brackets) for a US economy, varying
the arrival rate of ¯ring permissions, simulated 100 times over 100 quarters .
Data Sources: aBlanchard and Portugal (2000) once quits have been taken away;
bBlanchard and Diamond (1990); cDavis and Haltiwanger (1992); dMortensen
(1994); eMertz (1992); fComputed from U.S unemployment 1960:1 - 1999:3.
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simulation stats - varying ¾
baseline ¾ = 0:3 ¾ = 0:5 data
mean(out) 5:78
(0:33)
6:58
(0:30)
7:49
(0:26)
3.07-4.27a
mean(in) 5:78
(0:33)
6:58
(0:30)
7:49
(0:26)
3.37-4.76a
mean(quits) 2:93
(0:23)
2:12
(0:19)
1:34
(0:14)
2.93b
sd(out) 0:76
(0:20)
0:62
(0:09)
0:56
(0:10)
sd(in) 0:68
(0:14)
0:57
(0:09)
0:47
(0:07)
corr(net; outr) 0:75
(0:10)
0:66
(0:12)
0:55
(0:11)
corr(net; in) ¡0:57
(0:11)
¡0:55
(0:11)
¡0:51
(0:09)
corr(jc; jd) ¡0:23
(0:19)
¡0:13
(0:16)
¡0:06
(0:09)
-0.36c
corr(net; quits) 0:18
(0:07)
0:18
(0:07)
0:19
(0:08)
corr(in; out) 0:23
(0:28)
0:29
(0:21)
0:26
(0:15)
0.16d
corr(u; v) ¡0:71
(0:31)
¡0:85
(0:14)
¡0:91
(0:05)
-0.88e
mean(u) 5:95
(0:79)
8:00
(0:99)
11:5
(1:32)
6.00f
sd(u) 1:14
(0:32)
1:30
(0:42)
1:66
(0:59)
1.49f
mean(duration) 1:09
(0:09)
1:32
(0:12)
1:74
(0:17)
1.00d
Table 3: results (mean values with s.ds in brackets) for a US economy, vary-
ing the replacement ratio, simulated 100 times over 100 quarters . Data
Sources: aBlanchard and Portugal (2000) once quits have been taken away;
bBlanchard and Diamond (1990); cDavis and Haltiwanger (1992); dMortensen
(1994); eMertz (1992); fComputed from U.S unemployment 1960:1 - 1999:3.
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simulation stats - for Spain
pre-1985 post-1985 data
mean(out) 6:10
(0:43)
6:08
(0:94)
5.2a
mean(in) 6:10
(0:34)
6:08
(0:89)
5.8a
mean(quits) 0:65
(0:17)
2:78
(0:69)
2.78b
corr(net; out) 0:92
(0:05)
0:72
(0:14)
0.74a
corr(net; in) ¡0:25
(0:21)
¡0:54
(0:17)
-0.63a
corr(net; jc) 0:96
(0:03)
0:89
(0:07)
0.95c
corr(net; jd) ¡0:11
(0:26)
¡0:50
(0:12)
-0.94c
corr(jc; jd) 0:16
(0:26)
¡0:07
(0:21)
corr(net; quits) 0:48
(0:23)
0:48
(0:23)
corr(in; out) 0:11
(0:25)
0:15
(0:28)
-0.24a
corr(u; v) ¡0:84
(0:10)
¡0:79
(0:08)
mean(u) 14:9
(4:62)
18:2
(7:72)
15.0, 18.0d
sd(u) 3:05
(2:38)
6:28
(4:34)
5.01, 2.61e
mean(duration) 3:06
(1:31)
4:70
(1:40)
4.5a
Table 4: results (mean values with s.ds in brackets) for a Spanish economy,
simulated 100 times over 100 quarters . Data Sources: aEPA gross °ows for
period 1988:4-1999:3 - see section 3; bjob-to-job °ow measure for period 1988:4-
1999:3 - see section 3; cDolado and Gmez (1995); dEstrada, Hernando and
Lpez-Salido (2000) - for respective periods; eEPA o±cial data - for respective
periods.
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